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ABSTRACT: State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were designed to supplement the Federal
Trade Commission’s mission of protecting consumers and are often referred to as “little-FTC
Acts.” There is growing concern that enforcement under these acts is not only qualitatively
different than FTC enforcement, but may be counterproductive for consumers. This article
examines a sample of CPA claims and compares them to the FTC standard. It identifies
qualitative differences between CPA and FTC claims by commissioning a “Shadow Federal
Trade Commission” of experts in consumer protection. The study finds that many CPA claims
include conduct that would not be illegal under the FTC standards and that most of the cases
with illegal conduct would not warrant FTC enforcement. Even among CPA cases where the
plaintiff prevailed, nearly half do not include illegal conduct under the FTC standard and most
of the cases with illegal conduct would not invoke FTC enforcement. The results clearly suggest
private litigation under little-FTC Acts tends to pursue a different consumer protection mission
than the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission.
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ARE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS REALLY LITTLE-FTC ACTS?

Henry N. Butler*
Joshua D. Wright**
INTRODUCTION
During the 1960s there was a perceived increase in demand from the American public
and elected officials for consumer protection legislation.1 In post World War II America, a
perception emerged that markets had become impersonal2 and that the balance of power between
consumers and merchants in the marketplace had shifted in favor of merchants.3 Regulators
viewed increased legal protection for consumers as necessary to restore the former balance.4
Traditional common law protection was deemed inadequate.5 State Attorneys General attempted
to respond to the apparent need for greater consumer protection by using existing statutory laws,
*
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1
For example, President John F. Kennedy promoted the consumer protection movement by defining the consumers’ “bill of
rights” in a message to Congress in 1962. PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, H.R. DOC. NO. 364, 87TH Congress, 2d Sess. (March 15,
1962).
2
William A. Lovett, Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 725
(1972); James R. Withrow, Jr., The Inadequacies of Consumer Protection by Administrative Action, 1967 N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N
ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUMS 58, 64 (“The difficulties being faced by the consumer today are best understood in terms of the new
‘impersonality’ of the market place.”); see also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF
ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 395 (1971).
3
H. Peter Norstrand, Treble Damage Actions for Victims of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices: A New Approach, 4 NEW
ENG. LAW REV. 171, 175 (1969) (“[T]he consumer has lost the leverage he once had in the marketplace. The disgruntled buyer
can no longer hash out differences with his shopkeeper-neighbor; he is now confronted by impersonal bigness where
responsibility and liability forever lie just one department away.”).
4
Brian J. Linn & Gretchen Newman, Part III: Implementing the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 10 GONZ. L. REV.
593, 597 (1975) (“[T}he goal is to reestablish equilibrium in the market place by recognizing that traditional remedies for fraud
have proved ineffective in providing the aggrieved consumer adequate relief.”).
5
Common law causes of action—including deceit, misrepresentation, and breach of warranty—had relatively difficult
burdens of proof and limited remedies. As a consequence, they were thought to be insufficient to protect the consumer. For
example, to succeed in a tort action for false misrepresentation or deceit, the plaintiff must prove that there was intent to deceive,
which is particularly difficult to do. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection
Acts, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005). Actions in contract for breach of contract or breach of warranty are seldom more effective
than actions in tort as merchants can make false claims without entering into contracts. Id.
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such as lottery laws and printer’s ink laws, to protect consumer interests. They also advocated
broader statutory powers to combat consumer fraud and other deceptive practices.6 The state
legislatures’ responses came in the form of a diverse collection of legislation commonly called
Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs).
Most CPAs were originally designed to supplement the Federal Trade Commission’s
(FTC’s) mission of protecting consumers from “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”7 and are
referred to as “little-FTC Acts.” The FTC Act does not itself provide for private actions, but a
primary means of achieving the CPAs’ consumer protection goal is the private action that
empowered consumer attorneys to act as private attorneys general. In contrast to the FTC, which
is guided by a public interest mandate,8 private litigants under CPAs are not limited by political
pressure, public duty, or even financial constraints as many CPAs mandate the award of
multiplied damages and attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs.9 As such, there may be support
for the theory that CPAs do, in fact, fill a gap in existing consumer protection institutions by
allowing private litigants to bring smaller scale cases where the consumer harm is felt locally or
otherwise escapes the attention of the Federal Trade Commission. These cases may approximate
FTC enforcement actions, but due to their size may not warrant allocation of FTC resources or
meet the FTC requirement that consumer protection actions be in the public interest.10 The
consumer is free, even incentivized, to pursue any case on which they might expect to prevail.
State CPAs have become controversial.11

There is growing concern that CPA

enforcement and litigation are not only qualitatively different than FTC enforcement, but may be
counterproductive for consumers. Critics argue that the combination of private rights of action,
generous remedies, expansive and elusive definitions of illegal conduct, lack of administrative
6

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 2, at 396.
42 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
8
The FTC and private litigants face different incentives and constraints that affect the nature of actions pursued. Jeff
Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act: Reconsidering the FTC as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437,
437 (1991). For example, the FTC may decline to pursue an enforcement action that would be pursued by an individual
consumer, or class of consumers, under a CPA. The FTC faces three primary limitations in selecting enforcement actions that do
not constrain the private plaintiff. First, as political appointees, some FTC Commissioners are bound to be subject to political
pressure to pursue or not pursue certain types of actions. Id. at 441. Second, the FTC has limited resources which must be
rationed to enforcement actions against only the most serious improprieties. Id. at 442. Third, the FTC Act itself restricts the
FTC to bring proceedings only when it would be in the public interest. Id.
9
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3.
10
Marshall A. Leaffer & Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private
Use of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 554 (1980).
11
Compare Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, and Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common
Law, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 155 (2004) with Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers: Consumer
Protection Statues as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 829 (2006), .
7
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expertise, and relaxation of common law limitations have generated a set of incentives that
encourages plaintiffs and their attorneys to file claims of dubious merit. Critics suggest that
CPAs’ broader enforcement options place significant strains on the civil justice system without
providing offsetting gains in consumer protection.12 Proponents of CPAs counter that private
rights of action and meaningful remedies are necessary to supplement FTC enforcement and
provide sufficient incentives for individual plaintiffs to bring suit to deter conduct harmful to a
larger class of consumers.13 While both critics and proponents of CPA enforcement make claims
about the nature and quality of state consumer protection litigation, it is difficult to compare
litigation under state CPAs to FTC enforcement.
This article closely examines a sample of CPA claims and compares them to the FTC Act
standard for unfair and deceptive acts or practices. It identifies qualitative differences between
CPA and FTC claims by creating a “Shadow Federal Trade Commission” of consumer
protection experts. These experts evaluate a sample of CPA claims under the FTC standard.
These two studies generate data that is critical to informing policy debates on the appropriate
role of CPAs in the civil justice system.
Section I of this Article provides the background and history of CPAs. Section II
describes the data and research methodology for the “Shadow FTC” study. Section III presents
the Shadow FTC results. The basic result is that the little-FTC Acts appear to have taken on a
much broader consumer protection function than the FTC.

Section IV considers the policy

implications of these results.

I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS
A. Criticism of Existing Methods of Consumer Protection and the Call for CPAs
The push for states to adopt CPAs appears to have come from the confluence of three
related forces in the late 1960s: criticism of FTC consumer protection efforts, popular demand
for consumer protection and business regulation, and frustration with common law causes of
action. These three forces touch on each of the existing institutions of consumer protection:

12

See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming State Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic Approach,
2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1125305; Greve, supra note 11; Schwarz &
Silverman, supra note 5.
13
See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 11, at 832.
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federal regulation, market forces, and state common law.14 It was the perceived inadequacies of
each of these institutions that lead states to enact CPAs.
The FTC was the target of criticism of federal consumer protection.

By 1969

denouncement of the FTC had reached its zenith with publication of critical reports from
“Nader’s Raiders,”15 the American Bar Association,16 and Professor Richard Posner.17 This
criticism addressed a range of perceived problems at the FTC,18 including those offered by prior
critics:19 poor leadership,20 insufficient and misallocated resources,21 political favoritism and
regulatory capture,22 and protection of producers in the name of consumer protection.23
Proponents of stronger regulation argued that federal regulation and market forces no
longer adequately protected consumers. The increasingly impersonal nature of transactions in
the post-World War II economy had undercut consumers’ power to protect themselves through
market-based and reputation-based mechanisms.24 Consumer protection advocates also pointed

14
See Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future Development of U.S. Consumer Protection Policy
(George Mason University School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper Series, 2004) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=545182 (describing the institutions of consumer protection, yet neglecting the role of state consumer
protection laws).
15
EDWARD R. COX, ROBERT C. FELLMETH & JOHN E. SCHULZ, “THE NADER REPORT” ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(1969).
16
AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969).
17
Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 48, 48 (1969) (listing publications between 1924
and 1969 criticizing the Federal Trade Commission). Posner was also a member of the ABA Commission that authored the 1969
report. See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 16.
18
Posner, supra note 17, at 48 (“The Commission is rudderless; poorly managed and poorly staffed; obsessed with trivia;
politicized; all in all, inefficient and incompetent.”); AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 16,
at 1 (“Through lack of effective direction, the FTC has failed to establish goals and priorities, to provide necessary guidance to its
staff, and to manage the flow of its work in an efficient and expeditious manner. . . . Through an inadequate system of
recruitment and promotion, it has acquired and elevated to important positions a number of staff members of insufficient
competence. The failure of the FTC to establish and adhere to a system of priorities has caused a misallocation of funds and
personnel to trivial matters rather than to matters of pressing public concern. . . . The primary responsibility for these failures
must rest with the leadership of the Commission.”); COX ET AL., supra note 15, at 39 (“1. The FTC has failed to detect violations
systematically. 2. The FTC has failed to establish efficient priorities for its enforcement energy. 3. The FTC has failed to
enforce the powers it has with energy and speed. 4. The FTC has failed to seek sufficient statutory authority to make its work
effective.”).
19
Posner, supra note 17, at 47 (“What is remarkable about these studies, which span a period of 45 years, is the sameness of
their conclusions.”).
20
Id. at 87 (“[T]he Commission today is probably more poorly managed than other federal agencies.”); AM. BAR ASS’N
COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 16, at 35-36; COX ET AL., supra note 15, at 169-171.
21
AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 16, at 26-28.
22
COX ET AL., supra note 15, at 130-140.
23
Posner, supra note 17, at 71 (“A perusal of FTC rules and decisions reveals hundreds of cases in which prohibitory orders
have been entered against practices, not involving serious deception, by which sellers have attempted to market a new, often
cheaper, substitute for an existing product.”).
24
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL,
supra note 2, at 395; Lovett, supra note 2, at 725); Withrow, supra note 2, at 64 (“The difficulties being faced by the consumer
today are best understood in terms of the new ‘impersonality’ of the market place.”).
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to the increasing complexity of credit arrangements, marketing schemes,25 and warranty
disclaimers as evidence of the breakdown of the traditional, “arm’s-length bargain” approach to
consumer transactions.26

The general perception was that the balance of power between

consumers and merchants in the marketplace had shifted towards merchants, who now enjoyed
disproportionate influence in consumer transactions.

It appears that there was widespread

support for greater legal protection for consumers in order to restore the former balance.27
The final factor leading to the push for states to enact CPAs was the view that common
law causes of action were insufficient to protect the consumer—particularly because they
imposed impractically high evidentiary burdens in exchange for meager remedies.28

The

common law actions for fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit serve as examples of the
common law’s impracticality in consumer protection cases. These causes of action required
actual injury to mature; this requirement precluded prospective injunctions against merchants
engaging in potentially deceptive acts. An additional barrier to consumer protection suits was
the requirement that an injured party had the difficult burden of proving that there was intent to
deceive.29 Actions for breach of contract or warranty were seldom more effective than actions in
tort as merchants could make false claims without entering into contracts.30 Even where there
was a contract, contractual defenses such as reliance and privity requirements could impede
consumer recovery.31 Further, even if the consumer had a valid claim and could meet the burden
of proof, she might still have chosen to forego pursuit of the claim if it involved a pecuniary loss
that was small relative to the cost of bringing suit.
In the face of criticism of the FTC, popular demand for increased regulation of business,
and frustration with the limits of common law causes of action, many states adopted consumer
protection legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By 1981, every state had adopted some
25

NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 2, at 395.
Lovett, supra note 2, at 725.
27
Linn & Newman, supra note 4, at 597 (“[T]he goal is to reestablish equilibrium in the market place by recognizing that
traditional remedies for fraud have proved ineffective in providing the aggrieved consumer adequate relief.”); Norstrand supra
note 3, at 175 (“[T]he consumer has lost the leverage he once had in the marketplace. The disgruntled buyer can no longer hash
out differences with his shopkeeper-neighbor; he is now confronted by impersonal bigness where responsibility and liability
forever lie just one department away.”).
28
Robert Quinn, Consumer Protection Comes of Age in Massachusetts, 4 NEW ENG. REV. 72 (1969)(“It was, after all,
primarily the failure of the legal system to provide adequate remedies which led to the great consumer movement of the past
decade with the resultant deluge of new laws.”).
29
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 7.
30
Id.
31
Sovern, supra note 8, at 439-40.
26

5

consumer protection legislation. Most states have frequently amended their consumer protection
legislation, resulting in great variation between states—even where the same model act was
initially adopted.32
B. Consumer Fraud Acts and Early Model Acts

By 1962, six states had responded to the call for consumer protection and passed some
act aimed at protecting consumers.33 These early CPAs generally armed state Attorneys General
with the power to seek and receive injunctions against specific practices. One early adopter,
New Jersey, passed a “consumer fraud statute” in 1960 which became the model for several
states’ initial CPAs.34 The act gave the Attorney General broad powers to investigate alleged
unlawful practices, to obtain an injunction against persons engaging or about to engage in the
unlawful practices, and to seek restitution for those harmed by the prohibited practices.35 While
several states passed similar acts, others, such as Washington, enacted legislation modeled on the
FTC Act and the Clayton Act.36
Several uniform and model statutes appeared in the late 1960s.37 Many modern CPA
attributes can be traced back to these early model and uniform statutes. The first of the uniform
consumer protection statutes to appear was the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(UDTPA), which was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 196438 and rewritten in 1966.39 The UDTPA lists twelve deceptive trade practices, the
first eleven of which can be roughly divided into three categories of prohibited conduct:
misleading trade identification, false advertising, and deceptive advertising.40 The final listed
practice was a general prohibition of “any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of
32

MARY DEE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW, §2:10 (2008).
Id. at App 3A.
34
1960 NJ. LAWS ch. 39, §§1-12.
35
Id. §5.
36
Consumer Protection-Unfair Competition and Acts, 1961 Wash. Sess. Law, ch. 216. Section 2 of the Washington
legislation paralleled the FTC Act and read: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade of commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”
37
See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 2, at 400.
38
UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT (1964).
39
Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in Consumer Protection: At Odds with Antitrust History and
Precedent, 73 TENN. L. REV. 131, 145 (2006); NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 2,
at 400 .
40
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS SEVENTY-THIRD YEAR, 253 (1964).
33
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confusion or misunderstanding.”41

The twelve deceptive trade practices prohibited by the

UDTPA, including the final, more general prohibition of other unfair conduct, were intended
primarily to prevent unfair business competition, not to protect consumers.42
The UDTPA granted a private right of action, but limited the remedy to injunctive relief.
The UDTPA did not contain the restrictions of common law causes of action—neither proof of
damages nor intent to deceive were required to obtain an injunction. As amended in 1966, the
UDTPA authorized reasonable attorneys’ fees to be granted to the plaintiff if the defendant
willfully and knowingly engaged in the deceptive practice and to the defendant if the plaintiff
knew his complaint was groundless.43 Most of the states that initially adopted the UDTPA in
some form later amended their consumer protection law to allow monetary relief to consumers.44
The Model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL) is the model
statute most commonly associated with modern CPA laws. Developed by the FTC and adopted
by the Committee on Suggested State Legislation of the Council of State Governments, the
UTPCPL was originally published in 1967, only to be amended in 1969 and again in 1970.45
The UTPCPL was less innovative than comprehensive. It brought together many elements of
prior pieces of consumer protection legislation and, in doing so, created an attractive private
cause of action.
The 1970 version of the UTPCPL offered a choice of three forms of unlawful practices.46
The first alternative form of unlawful practices used essentially the same language as Section 5
of the FTC Act: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.”47 This language has led many
commentators to refer to CPAs in this vein as “Little FTC Acts.”48 Twenty states initially
adopted such acts.49

41

Id. at 253.
Bauer, supra note 39, at 145; PRIDGEN, supra note 32, §2:10.
43
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, supra note 40, at 299,
44
PRIDGEN, supra note 32, §2:10.
45
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 2, at 399.
46
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 1970 Suggested State Legislation, 142 (1970).
47
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW (Council of State Gov’ts 1970). The first version of the
UTPCPL in 1967 used only this language to define the prohibited acts. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 142.
48
PRIDGEN, supra note 32, §2:10.
49
Id. §2:10.
42
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The second alternative form of unlawful action prohibited by the UTPCPL resembled the
language of the consumer fraud acts adopted in the early and mid-1960s by states such as New
Jersey.50 This alternative defined as unlawful “[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce.”51 This definition does not prohibit the broad category
of “unfair practices.”52 Although a number of states had adopted similar consumer fraud acts
earlier in the 1960s, no state adopted this language based upon the UTPCPL.53
The third alternative offered by the UTPCPL, known as the “laundry list approach,”
included the twelve competition-focused prohibitions enumerated in the UDTPA.54 It added an
additional thirteenth provision focused more directly on consumers.55 This thirteenth provision
prohibited any act or practice that was “unfair or deceptive to the consumer.”56 Twenty-six
jurisdictions adopted this language.57 Today, most of the states that had originally adopted the
third form no longer rely exclusively on the laundry list approach; however, five jurisdictions
still prohibit only specific acts without a “catch-all” provision prohibiting unfair and deceptive
practices.58

50

COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 142.
Id.
52
PRIDGEN, supra note 32, §2:10.
53
Id.
54
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, supra note 46, at 142.
55
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW §2 (Council of State Gov’ts 1970) (“The following unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared to
be unlawful: (1) passing off goods or services as those of another; (2) causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as
to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services; (3) causing likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association with, or certification by, another; (4) using deceptive
representations or designations of geographic origin in connection with goods or services; (5) representing that goods or services
have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or qualities that they do not have or that a person has a
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have; (6) representing that goods are original or new if
that are deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand; (7) representing that goods or services are of a
particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another; (8) disparaging the
goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact; (9) advertising goods or services with intent
not to sell than as advertised; (10) advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable public demand,
unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity; (11) making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the
reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions; (12) engaging in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood
of confusion or of misunderstanding; or (13) engaging in any act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the consumer.”)
56
Id.
57
PRIDGEN, supra note 32, §2:10 (Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Virgin Islands, and West Virginia).
58
Id. (Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana, Mississippi, and New York have pure laundry lists approaches. The twentyone other jurisdictions that use a laundry list approach also have some general prohibition of unfair and deceptive acts.).
51
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The UTPCPL gave state Attorneys General the same basic powers as did the UDTPA.59
Section 5 authorized the Attorney General to act to enforce the prohibition of acts and practices
defined in § 2:
Whenever the [A]ttorney [G]eneral has reason to believe that any person is using,
has used, or is about to use any method, act or practice declared by Section 2 of
this Act to be unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, he
may bring an action in the name of the State against such person to restrain by
temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act or practice. . . .60
The Attorney General was also entitled to seek relief by restitution or disgorgement of money or
property acquired as a result of any act declared unlawful by the UTPCPL61 and civil penalties
for a knowing violation of the UTPCPL.62
In addition to attorney-general enforcement, the UTPCPL authorized private actions for
monetary damages. Section 8 of the UTPCPL authorized private suits and class actions for
monetary damages as well as injunctive relief.63 Private individuals could recover the greater of
“actual damages or $200,” with punitive damages and equitable relief available at the court’s
discretion.64 Section 8(b) authorized “persons similarly situated” to bring a class action. Section
8(d) stated that the court “may award, in addition to the relief provided in this Section,
reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”65
The UTPCPL consciously attempted not to stray too far from relevant FTC enforcement
standards. Section 3 stated that “due consideration and great weight shall be given to the
interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to Section 5(a)(1)

59

The UTPCPL gave the Attorney General powers similar to those granted in the earlier consumer fraud acts. Sections 11
through 14 granted the Attorney General broad investigatory powers, the power to issue subpoenas, and the power to enforce the
investigatory demands.
60
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW § 2 (Council of State Gov’ts 1970).
61
Id. § 6.
62
Id. §15.
63
Id. § 8 (Section 8(a) read in part “Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or
household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or
employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by Section 2 of this Act, may bring an action. . .
.”).
64
Id.
65
Id.

9

of the Federal Trade Commission Act.”66 Further, it empowered the Attorney General to “make
rules and regulations interpreting” the prohibited actions, but that:
[s]uch rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations
and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts in
interpreting the provisions of Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.67
Twenty-eight states currently reference the FTC in their CPA.68
C. Comparing Federal and State Consumer Protection
Having been enacted in the face of criticism of the FTC, it is not surprising that state and
federal consumer protection legislation have noticeable differences. The key differences are that
states provide a private right of action, different remedies, and relaxed common law limitations
on consumer protection actions when compared to FTC policy standards.
The FTC Act does not include a private enforcement mechanism, yet every CPA grants
consumers a private right of action.69 This difference is driven by the “balance of power”
argument that in interactions between businesses and consumers, more power must be shifted
towards consumers. This argument suggests that a private remedy for wronged consumers is
necessary for the effective prosecution of consumer complaints.70 These private rights of action
were envisioned as a complement to public agency administrative enforcement under the FTC
Act. Although public enforcement under the FTC Act requires the Commission to consider the
public interest in deciding whether to challenge a practice, only a few states include a public
interest requirement for private actions.71

66

Id. § 3.
Id.
68
PRIDGEN, supra note 32, app. 3B (Most states’ statutes provide that the courts should be guided by FTC interpretations,
but that such interpretations are not dispositive.).
69
Iowa was the last state without a private right of action, but recently enacted one with the Private Right of action for
Consumer Fraud Act. See Iowa Ann. Code §714H (West 2009).
70
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 2, at 408.
71
See, e.g., Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 234, (Colo. 1998) (the practice challenged by an individual under COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-1-113 (1998) must significantly impact the public as actual or potential consumers); Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App.
82, 84, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 (1980) (stating that unless the defendant’s actions had or has potential harm for the consumer public
they are not directly regulated by the FBPA, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-3-0 et. seq.); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2000) (public
interest must be demonstrated to state a claim under the private A.G. statute – relating to the CFA, MINN. STAT. § 325F.68 et.
seq.); Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 258 Neb. 678, 605 N.W.2d 136 (2000) (to be actionable under the CPA the
unfair/deception act must have impact on the public interest); Jefferies v. Phillips, 316 S.C. 523, 451 S.E.2d 21, 1994 S.C. App.
67
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A second difference between CPAs and FTC consumer protection is that the statutes
confer different remedies.72 Remedies available under the FTC Act include injunctions, cease
and desist orders, consent decrees, and the disgorgement of profits. While at least a dozen CPAs
limit plaintiffs to actual damages, restitution, or equitable relief,73 the majority of statutes provide
additional remedies, including statutory damages, treble damages,74 and punitive damages.
Nearly all states authorize the discretionary award of attorney’s fees.75
A third dimension upon which CPAs differ from the FTC Act, and also from one another,
is the degree to which state legislation and judicial interpretation have relaxed the common law
limitations on consumer protection claims. The common law requirement of reliance is a useful
example. The majority of statutes do not require a CPA plaintiff to show that he or she relied on
the defendant’s allegedly deceptive act or statement,76 while the FTC requires reasonable
reliance in its definitions of both unfair and deceptive practices.77 Other state courts have held
that a misrepresentation, absent evidence of other harm to the consumer or that the plaintiff
relied on the misrepresentation, is sufficient to demonstrate consumer injury.78 Some state courts
have held that defenses such as the statute of frauds,79 warranty disclaimers,80 the doctrine of

Lexis 139 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (to be actionable under SCUPTA, S.C. CODE § 39-5-20, unfair or deceptive practices must
adversely affect the public interest); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 719 P.2d
531 (1986) (private litigant must establish a public interest impact to establish a prima facie case under the CPA, REV. CODE
WASH. § 19.86.010 et. seq.).
72
See Butler & Johnston, supra note 12.
73
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 501.211(2) (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (1996);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1213 (1997); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-408 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-15(1) (1999);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1609 (2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-31 (2004); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(b)(1) (2002);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.18(11)(b)(2) (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-108(b) (2005).
74
See, Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5. In some cases, damages are doubled or trebled regardless of the egregiousness
of the defendant’s conduct. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.531(a) (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3905(k) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 480-13 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-16 (2003); WIS. STAT. § 100.20(5) (2004). Nine
states treble damages if the defendant acted intentionally, willfully, knowingly, or in bad faith. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1113(2)(a)(III); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(c) (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 93A, § 9(3); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:10
(1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(B); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349(h); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-140(a) (1985); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-18-109(a)(3) (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-204(A); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (2002).
75
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 25.
76
For detailed analysis and citations, see Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5.
77
Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, to John Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy
and Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decpet.htm; Letter from Michael Pertschuk,
Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, and Paul Rand Dixon, David A. Clanton, Robert Pitofsky, and Patricia P. Bailey,
Commissioners, Federal Trade Commission, to Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, and John C. Danforth, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Dec.
17, 1980), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm.
78
Aspinall v. Philip Morris, 813 N.E.2d 476, 486 (Mass. 2005).
79
See, e.g., McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. Supp. 211, 224 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding the statute of frauds was not applicable
under Texas deceptive trade practices act).
80
See, e.g., Attaway v. Tom's Auto Sales, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 813, 242 S.E.2d 740 (1978).
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substantial performance,81 the parol evidence rule,82 the common law merger doctrine,83
contractual limitations on liability or remedies,84 and privity of contract requirements85 are not
available to defendants in consumer protection cases.
The CPAs’ attractive private right of action, unlike the FTC standard, is often divorced
from a public interest requirement and from common-law limitations. These differences have
caused some to suggest that CPAs may be subject to abuse by litigants who have suffered no
actual harm, and that this abuse will ultimately harm, rather than protect, consumers.86

D. Expanding and Amending CPAs
Amendments and judicial interpretation of CPAs have tended to expand rather than
contract the rights of consumers.87 Massachusetts’ experience is representative of the early
expansion of CPAs. Massachusetts’ original CPA gave the Commonwealth’s Attorney General
the authority to investigate and subpoena88 and, in the interest of the public, bring an action
seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties up to $10,000.89 The law originally did not provide
for any type of private action, and aggrieved consumers could seek recourse only through
common law alternatives in tort or contract.90 In 1969, the CPA was amended to give a private
right of action by adopting language similar to Section 8 of the UTPCPL.91

81

The amendment

See, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. 1980). The court explained that “[a] primary purpose of the
enactment of the DTPA was to provide consumers a cause of action for deceptive trade practices without the burden of proof and
numerous defenses encountered in a common law fraud or breach of warranty suit.” Id. at 616.
82
See, e.g., Teague Motor Co. v. Rowton, 84 Or. App. 72, 733 P.2d 93 (1987) (holding that parol evidence may be used in
Oregon consumer protection cases); Weitzel v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (holding that parol evidence may be
used in Texas consumer protection cases); Capp Homes v. Duarto, 617 F.2d 900, 902 n.1 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that parol
evidence may be used in Massachusetts consumer protection cases).
83
See generally Raren S. Guerra, DTPA Precludes Use of Merger Doctrine and Parol Evidence Rule in Breach of Warranty
Suit: Alvarado v. Bolton, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 373 (1989). [Maybe cite directly to the case then have a parenthetical for the see
generally to the article]
84
See, e.g., International Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distrib., 803 F.2d 150, 155-56 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
contractual limitations inapplicable in suit under Texas “Little FTC Act”); Corral v. Rolling Protective Serv. Co., 240 Kan. 678,
732 P.2d 1260 (1987) (holding similarly under Kansas law); Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus., 688 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding similarly under Texas law).
85
See generally Note, The DTPA and Privity: Let the Buyer Beware Becomes Let the Buyer Recover, 39 BAYLOR L. REV.
787 (1987).
86
See, e.g., Butler and Johnston, supra note 12.
87
However, this is not true for all state statutes. For example the Illinois Supreme Court has contracted the geographic
scope of its CPA. See Avery v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., N.E.2d 801, 881 (Ill. 2005) at 863-64 (limiting class actions
brought under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to fraudulent transactions that occur within Illinois borders).
88
MASS GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 93A, §6 (1967).
89
Id. §4.
90
Norstrand, supra note 3, at 173.
91
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 2, at 408.
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allowed consumers to receive the greater of treble damages or $25 upon proof of injury by an
unfair or deceptive practice.92
Amendments to CPAs have often sought to provide adequate incentives for consumers
to act as private enforcers. Proponents of CPAs argued that if consumers were not willing to
litigate and pursue complaints, CPAs could not fulfill their intended purpose of deterring
deceptive and unfair trade practices.

Suits involving common law actions were often

uneconomical for the aggrieved consumer because of high burdens of proof and difficulty of
establishing damages.

CPAs circumvent these issues by providing causes of action which

require less rigorous burdens of proof than their common law counterparts. For example, the
UDTPA stated that “[p]roof of monetary damage, loss of profits, or intent to deceive is not
required [to receive relief].”93 CPA expansion has also often involved a reduction in the burden
of proof required of consumers.94
These reductions in the burden of proof have been controversial. Some commentators
argued that the presence of a credible threat in the form of a private right of action with treble
damages would be enough to restore the equilibrium between consumers and merchants, and
reductions in the burden of proof are not necessary.95 Others recognize that CPAs give rise to
the potential for harassment of legitimate business conduct96 and that vague consumer fraud
statues invite the possibility of abuse.97
Amendments to CPAs have also tended to include provisions allowing for class actions.
States were slower to adopt class action provisions than private rights of action in large part
because of concerns of abuse.

In 1971, the National Association of Attorneys General

recommended that states empower Attorneys General to bring class action suits,98 but warned
that allowing private class action suits would “provide too great an opportunity for frivolous
suits.”99 Balancing these concerns, some states adopted the provision of private class action suits
along with provisions intended to make it harder to bring a frivolous class action suit. For
92

Id.
UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT §3 (1964).
94
David A. Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307, 307 (1969).
95
Norstrand, supra note 3, at 175 (“Even if rarely invoked, awareness by the consumer that he need not be helpless when
victimized by fraud can only improve the commercial climate. If this means ‘caveat vendor’, then so be it.”).
96
Lovett, supra note 2, at 744.
97
E.g., Rice, supra note 94, at 340.
98
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., supra note 2, at 409.
99
Id.
93
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example, Massachusetts attempted to avoid frivolous class actions by requiring a 30 day
opportunity for the respondent to the potential class action to make restitution.100 Alaska’s class
action provision required approval by the Attorney General and a bond before a class action suit
could be certified.101 The Uniform Consumer Sales Practice Act provided fee-shifting in favor
of defendants if a class action suit was found to be groundless.102
E. Modern Concerns Emerge
By the early 1990s, the increasing use of CPAs generated criticism that CPAs were being
used in ways that the legislatures never intended, leading to substantial abuse and frivolous
lawsuits.103 Commentators and experts began to question whether CPAs were fulfilling their
original promise to supplement public enforcement and enhance consumer outcomes, and
whether the courts were interpreting the statutes correctly, especially in the private litigation
context.104 Others argued that the low threshold for “unfair and deceptive acts” had gone too far
in aiding plaintiffs, encouraging claims that ultimately were not in the public interest105 and that
the low level of proof required in a CPA claim made it too easy for an unharmed consumer to
succeed and receive substantial damages.106 In addition, some commentators have argued that
claims were increasingly brought under the auspices of consumer protection that would have
traditionally been brought as environmental, product liability, or contract claims.107 Recent
commentators have argued that modern CPA liability, characterized by supra-compensatory
remedies and minimal injury requirements, may have harmful consequences for consumers by
taxing socially desirable business conduct such as communications between merchants and
consumers.108

What follows is the first attempt to bring a large-scale, empirical analysis to bear

on these modern concerns.

100

Id.
Id. at 409-10.
102
Id. at 409.
103
Wayne E. Green, Lawyers Give Deceptive-Trade Statutes New Day in Court, Wider Interpretations, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
1990, at B1..
104
Perry A. Craft, State Consumer Protection Enforcement: Recent Trends and Developments, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 991, 997
(1991) (Throughout the 1980s states’ Attorneys General were active in enforcement of their states CPAs, without substantial
criticism.).
105
Sovern, supra note 8, at 437.
106
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3; Jon Mize, Fencing Off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-Examining the Role of
Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 TENN. L. REV. 653, 653-54 (2005).
107
Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 5, at 3-4.
108
See Butler and Johnston, supra note 12. Actual and potential defendant merchants may pass the costs of CPA litigation
on to consumers through higher prices. Id.
101
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II. SHADOW FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
Many of the key policy questions involving CPAs require some comparison of CPA
claims to other possible standards for consumer protection. This section focuses on whether
there are important qualitative differences in claims between those brought in courts and
enforcement actions brought under FTC Section 5 standards by creating an expert panel to
review and apply the FTC standard to a sample of cases litigated under CPAs. CPA claims are
compared to the benchmark established by the FTC consumer protection standard. Recognizing
the differences in claims brought under federal and state consumer protection authority is an
important first step to understanding the consumer protection litigation landscape.

These

possible differences, read in conjunction with the evidence that litigation activity is highly
correlated with CPA statutes that make lawsuits more attractive to plaintiffs, raise the possibility
that claims brought under CPAs are of a different nature than those enforced by the FTC.
In order to test whether qualitative differences exist between CPA cases and those falling
under the FTC’s standards for unfair and deceptive practices, an expert review panel (“Shadow
FTC”) consisting of five Shadow Commissioners with substantial consumer protection
experience at or with the FTC, reviewed sets of one page case scenarios of representative CPA
cases. The Shadow FTC answered questions on whether they believed these cases would likely
contain illegal conduct and, if so, would they likely be enforced under the FTC standard. The
Shadow FTC’s responses allow identification of important differences between the actual
outcomes of the CPA cases used in the review and likely outcomes under the FTC standard.
A. Shadow FTC Selection

Five individuals with substantial experience at or with the FTC Bureau of Consumer
Protection were hired to serve as Shadow Commissioners. The Shadow Commissioners include
four former Directors or Deputy Directors of the Bureau of Consumer Protection who are
practitioners and academics with significant expertise on consumer protection issues. The fifth
Shadow Commissioner did not serve at the FTC but has substantial experience as a practitioner.
The Shadow FTC was selected to ensure a balance in political orientation with two Shadow
Commissioners who served in the FTC during Democratic administrations and two who served
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in the FTC during Republican administrations. The fifth Shadow Commissioner did not serve at
the FTC under an administration of either party and, therefore, is considered to be unaffiliated.

B. Sample Selection of Cases
A key feature of the Shadow FTC study is the inclusion of litigated cases that generated
substantive decisions under CPAs. The cases were obtained from a database of approximately
17,000 CPA decisions.109 Three distinct samples of cases were constructed.
The first sample began with a randomly generated sample of 500 reported CPA decisions
from the original population database. From these 500 reported CPA decisions, 86 contained
case facts sufficient to develop one-page scenarios, and 50 of these 86 were randomly chosen.
The second sample was drawn from reported CPA decisions in state appellate courts but
not federal district courts because the former were more likely to have reached final disposition
as a “clear win” and less likely to have remaining appeals.

To be clear, this sample is

intentionally biased toward including the strongest CPA claims. For each state, a specific search
string was created that contained that state’s CPA title, abbreviation, or citation as well as
variations on the term “damage award.”110 These search strings were then applied to each state’s
“State Cases, Combined” database in Lexis from 2000 through 2007. This search resulted in
3,637 reported CPA decisions. We removed CPA claimant losses, wins that were subsequently
overturned on appeal, and false positives generated by the search string. We then randomly
selected and created the 50 “clear win” cases.
The third sample consisted of FTC cases to provide a control group. Eight decisions
were randomly selected, each representing a case the FTC brought in court containing sufficient
case facts.111 Two cases which the FTC investigated but ultimately dismissed the complaint
were separately chosen and added to the second sample.112 The third sample involves "clear
109

For a description of the database, see SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS, AN
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF PRIVATE LITIGATION (2009), available at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/issues/index.cfm?ID=86.
110
The search string used for the term “damage awards” was “damage! w/s award!”.
111
The set of FTC cases from which we drew the 8 was a set of FTC cases captured by the original over-inclusive search
string used to identify cases for the population database. These cases had been removed from the final population database
because they did not include CPA claims brought by either party in the suit at issue.
112
These two cases were not included in the population database nor randomly chosen as we had only limited available
information on FTC investigations where the Commission ultimately withdrew the complaint.
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wins" for CPA claimants at the state trial court level on the CPA claim where the result was
either unchallenged or upheld on appeal.
C. Case Summaries and Questionnaires
After selecting the three samples of cases, we developed one-page summaries of the cases
and a questionnaire for completion by the Shadow Commissioners. Party names and identifying
case characteristics were removed so that Shadow Commissioners could not directly identify the
cases. Before distributing the questionnaires to the Shadow Commissioners, an additional expert
in FTC consumer protection actions who is not a member of the Shadow FTC reviewed the
questions and case scenarios. Based on the reviewer’s feedback, adjustments were made to the
questions and scenarios to ensure that the Shadow Commissioners could complete the review of
all 60 scenarios – from each of the three samples – in three hours or less. After testing the
questionnaire, the questions in Figure 1 were used for each scenario.113
The survey process took place in two rounds during which the Shadow Commissioners
reviewed 110 one-page case scenarios. After reading the scenarios, each Shadow Commissioner
determined whether he or she believed the practice was unfair or deceptive according to FTC
standards and whether he or she believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement action. The
Shadow Commissioners were asked to base their answers only on the information presented in
the scenario, their understanding of current federal consumer protection law, their expertise, and
the assumptions that (1) the FTC has jurisdiction over the entity or entities and (2) the practice is
in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.
Shadow Commissioners were not told prior to completing each round that the case
scenarios were derived from litigated consumer protection cases.

Further, the Shadow

Commissioners did not know the identity of the other Shadow Commissioners, did not
collaborate in answering the questions, and could not consult any outside sources. The Shadow
Commissioners were not allowed to return to previous scenarios once they had answered a

113
To limit potential ordering effects, we changed the order of the scenarios three times with different versions issued
randomly to the Shadow Commissioners. We randomized the ordering by drawing the 60 numbers three separate times. After
the Shadow Commissioners completed the questionnaires, we collected the responses and informed the Shadow Commissioners
of the origin of the scenarios. We then coded the results of the questionnaire, identifying the Shadow Commissioners only by a
study code number.
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question. Shadow Commissioners were compensated for their participation. See Appendix A
and B for examples from the two rounds of scenarios.
Round 1 included the 50 cases from the random sample and the 10 cases from the FTC
control sample.

The random sample allows inferences to be drawn concerning the nature of

CPA claims distributed throughout the civil justice system.
Round 2 focused on the “clear wins” discussed above and examined how a sample of
successful CPA claims would fare under the FTC standard. Each decision in the population
database of reported CPA decisions represents a unique case and was not previously presented to
the Shadow Commissioners in Round 1.

The Shadow Commissioners answered the same

questions in three hours or less under the same parameters as Round 1, with the exception that
during Round 2 the Shadow Commissioners were aware that the case scenarios were derived
from litigated consumer protection cases. The Shadow Commissioners did not know the cases
all represented CPA claimant wins.114
The Shadow FTC review of litigated cases provides the opportunity to evaluate the
distribution of CPA claims currently moving through the civil justice system. While we do not
observe all litigated cases, this study presents an important first step in collecting and analyzing
data relevant to resolving important policy debates surrounding CPAs and civil justice reform
more generally. Questions 1a and 2a in Figure 1 focus on whether the Shadow Commissioner
believes the available excerpted facts constitute illegal conduct under the FTC Policy Statements
for deception or unfairness.115 Question 3a goes a step further to ask Shadow Commissioners
whether, relying on their own expertise and experience with FTC consumer protection
enforcement, they believe the FTC would initiate an enforcement action in the particular case.

114

To limit ordering effects, we changed the order of the scenarios three times with different versions issued randomly to the
Shadow Commissioners. We randomized the ordering by drawing the 50 numbers three separate times. We then coded the
results with the Shadow Commissioners identified only by a new study code number.
115
Letter from James C. Miller III, supra note 77; Letter from Michael Pertschuk, supra note 77.
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FIGURE 1
Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally deceptive under the FTC’s deception
policy statement?

□ Yes

□ No

Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception that are not satisfied.
□ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer
□ The consumer's interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation, omission or practice is
reasonable under the circumstances
□ The representation, omission or practice must be material

Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally unfair under the FTC’s unfairness policy
statement?

□ Yes

□ No

Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for unfairness that are not satisfied.
□ Cause substantial injury
□ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive benefits
□ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided

Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a consumer protection enforcement
action?

□ Yes

□ No

Q3b. Briefly explain __________________________________________________________________________

III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We first consider the Shadow Commission’s view of the illegality of state CPA claims
under the FTC standard. We then consider whether, if the Shadow Commission considered an
activity to be illegal, the Shadow Commission would pursue an enforcement action against the
illegal activity. Finally, we test the quality of the Shadow FTC’s decision making against
decisions by the actual FTC.
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Since the goal of the Shadow FTC was to simulate the hypothetical actions of the FTC,
only aggregate results appear below rather than individual Shadow Commissioner votes. The
results focus on the answers given by the majority (3 or more) of the Shadow Commissioners.
Unanimous votes were common, making up between 24.0% and 62.0% of responses depending
on question and round.
Votes where more than one commissioner disagreed with the majority were rare. There
were few 3-2 split votes where three commissioners voted one way and two the other. The large
majority of votes were either 5-0 or 4-1. In Round 1, out of the 50 non-FTC cases, the Shadow
Commissioners were split 30 times in 17 case scenarios: 8 times over deceptive conduct, 13
times over unfair conduct, and 9 times over the likelihood of enforcement. Similarly in the 50
Round 2 scenarios, out of 50 non-FTC cases, the Shadow Commissioners were split 30 times in
19 case scenarios: 16 times over deceptive conduct, 9 times over unfair conduct, and 5 times
over the likelihood of enforcement. We then examined instances of split voting to identify a
possible bias by political affiliation. It is unlikely that political affiliation drove split decisions.
Of the 30 votes that were split, only 17 split in such a way that both Republicans voted in one
way, and both Democrats voted the other.
A. Illegality
A critical empirical challenge in the CPA policy debate is to identify the quality of CPA
claims currently working through the civil justice system.

For Round 1, the Shadow

Commission found that most cases did not meet FTC illegality standards. A majority of Shadow
Commissioners believed that the alleged practice was illegal, either deceptive or unfair under the
relevant FTC Policy Statement in only 11 out of 50 (22.0%) of case scenarios.
This result suggests at the very least that the CPA claims litigated in state and federal
courts differ from those involving illegal conduct under the FTC standard. In other words, a
substantial majority of CPA litigation involves claims consistent with behavior that is likely legal
under the FTC standard. This result is consistent with the concern that CPAs apply more lenient
and plaintiff friendly standards which lower the quality of claim required to justify filing on an
expected value basis.
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Our Round 1 results should nonetheless be interpreted with caution. Other possible
explanations exist for the Shadow FTC's determination that the CPA claims in our random
sample of case scenarios do not violate federal consumer protection law under FTC standards.
One possible explanation is that the case fact descriptions forming the basis of the excerpts given
to Shadow Commissioners may not have included all of the facts ultimately relevant to the
determination of liability.

A second reason could be that in Round 1, while the Shadow

Commission found that 3 cases presented illegal actions that the FTC would likely enforce, only
2 cases had a clear CPA claimant win at trial.116
In Round 2, the sample of case scenarios involve "clear wins" for CPA claimants at the
state trial court level on the CPA claim where the result was either unchallenged or upheld on
appeal. Again, this is a sample biased intentionally toward the most successful CPA claims. Our
key finding from Round 2 is that the Shadow Commission believed that there was either unfair
or deceptive conduct under the FTC standards in 31 cases (or 62.0% of the time). Although all
Shadow Commissioners answered the questions on illegal acts for every scenario, in seven cases
the Shadow Commission had tied answers to the question on enforcement due to non-responses.
Removing those cases, a majority of Shadow Commissioners believed that there was an unfair or
deceptive act pursuant to the FTC standards in 24 out of 43 cases (55.8%).
The Round 1 and 2 questionnaires were constructed in the same manner and taken by the
same set of Shadow Commissioners at different times. The differences between the Shadow
Commission determinations in Round 1 and Round 2, when evaluating a random sample of CPA
cases and clear CPA wins respectively, are striking.117 Not surprisingly, the Shadow FTC was
more likely to believe that the scenarios for clear CPA wins (Round 2) involved illegal conduct
than the general CPA cases (Round 1) as can be seen in Table 1. The difference is significant at
the 1% level.118

116

The 2 cases do not include the ongoing cases of Round 1, and make up only 4.5% of the 44 closed cases.
Note that the underlying population of cases in Round 2 is a complete subset of the underlying population of cases in
Round 1. As such, there is some overlap that the z-statistics in this section do not take into account. However, given the positive
relationship between CPA cases that survive to trial and the likelihood that the Shadow Commission believes the conduct was
illegal under the FTC standards and/or that the FTC would initiate an enforcement action, it is likely that this overlap functionally
understates the true difference between clear CPA wins and all other CPA cases.
118
A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of cases where the majority of
Shadow Commissioners believed the scenario contained some illegal conduct under the FTC standards is the same between the
two rounds at the 1% level (z = -4.052, p = 0.000). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation.
117
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TABLE 1

Round 1

Round 2

Round 2*

FTC Controls

Total Cases

50

50

43

10

Possible Illegal Conduct

11

31

24

10

22.0%

62.0%

55.8%

100.0%

6

10

10

10

12.0%
54.5%

20.0%
32.3%

23.3%
41.7%

100.0%
100.0%

% of Total

Possible FTC Enforcement
% of Total
% of Possible Illegal Conduct

* Excludes cases where the enforcement question resulted in a tie vote.

Not surprisingly, for successful CPA claims in Round 2, the Shadow FTC was more
likely to find possible illegal conduct than in the representative sample of cases from Round 1.
However, even for Round 2’s successful CPA claims, the Shadow FTC only found possible
illegal conduct in just over one-half of the cases.119
It is striking that 19 of the 50 clear win cases involved activity that the Shadow FTC
would not consider to be illegal under the FTC standard. These Type 1 errors – finding innocent
parties guilty of wrongdoing – could represent an important problem with CPAs. More
specifically, under the plausible assumption that the FTC standard with its public interest
requirement is less likely to condemn efficient and pro-competitive business conduct than the
CPA standards, the Round 2 results suggest that CPA liability may condemn efficient, procompetitive conduct. Further, liability for efficient business conduct under CPAs could further
harm consumers through deterring efficient conduct more broadly. These Type 1 errors (“false
positives”) in the consumer protection context are likely to be greater than the social costs
associated with Type 2 errors (“false negatives”) because the market provides a self-correcting
mechanism for the latter.120 While direct empirical evidence on the social costs of errors is
difficult to obtain, these results raise significant concerns about whether the unintended
119

One possible concern is that the composition of cases across the rounds differed on some dimension other than the
disposition of the claim. For example, Round 2 cases did not include federal district court cases whereas Round 1 included both
federal and state court decisions. However, if only the state appellate court cases in both rounds are analyzed, there is still a
statistically significant difference at the 5% level. A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the
proportion of cases where the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the scenario contained some illegal conduct under the
FTC standards is the same between the two rounds at the 5% level (z = -2.536, p = 0.011). We get similar results for the nonparametric Spearman rank correlation.
120
For a similar analysis of asymmetrical error costs in the related antitrust context, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1984).
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consequences of CPA liability outweighs its consumer protection value, and there is evidence
from other settings that liability prone to significant Type 1 errors can lead to significant
consumer losses.121
B. Enforcement
In both rounds the Shadow Commission supported enforcement in less than a quarter of
the total scenarios. Of the 11 cases containing illegal conduct in Round 1, only 6 would result in
FTC enforcement. In Round 2, there were 31 cases of possible illegal activity, but only 10 cases
would trigger FTC enforcement. Although the Shadow Commission found possible illegal
conduct in 31 Round 2 cases, the Shadow Commission would recommend enforcement in only
10 of those cases.
When we dropped the 7 cases with the tied Shadow FTC from the Round 2, but including
all non-FTC cases from Round 1, the Shadow FTC believed that the FTC would initiate an
enforcement action in 6 of the 50 general CPA cases (or 12.0%) and in 10 of the 43 clear CPA
wins (or 23.3%), which can be seen in Table 1. This difference is statistically significant only at
slightly above the 15% level.122
Thus, focusing exclusively on the clear CPA wins, the Shadow Commission identified
deceptive or unfair conduct under the FTC standards in over half of the cases. Even in these
cases, however, the Shadow Commission believed that the FTC would only bring enforcement
actions less than a quarter of the time.

While for every scenario in which the Shadow

Commission believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement action the Shadow Commission
also believed that either deceptive or unfair conduct occurred, the reverse is not true. Of the 24
cases where the Shadow Commission thought the scenario indicated some illegal conduct under
121

Even though the average price effect of liability costs may be small across industries, in some sectors it can be quite
large. See Tomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and Effective?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 85,
94–95 (2008) (suggesting that the deadweight losses to consumers and producers from the price increase due to product liability
litigation in the pharmaceutical industry is in the tens of billions of dollars); Paul Rubin & Joanna Shepherd, Tort Reform and
Accidental Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221 (2007) (estimating that product liability has increased accidental deaths by raising the
prices of safety-enhancing goods and services); Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood
Vaccines, 37 J. L. & ECON. 247, 273 (1994) (suggesting that the price of vaccines went up twentyfold after product liability
imposed). For a discussion of these costs in the consumer protection context related to financial services, see David S. Evans and
Joshua D. Wright, The Effect of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 on Consumer Credit, 22 Loyola
Consumer Law Review 277 (2010).
122
A two-group test of proportions only allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of cases where the
majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement action based on the available case facts
between the two rounds at above the 15% level (z = -1.434, p = 0.152). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman
rank correlation.
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the FTC standards, in 10 of these cases the Shadow Commission also thought that the FTC
would initiate an enforcement action.

Specifically, the difference in proportions between

scenarios believed to have illegal conduct and those believed would be enforced by the FTC
based on the available case facts is significant at the 1% level.123
These findings could suggest that clear CPA wins may have been brought under similar
standards to the FTC’s but are less likely to be the type of case enforced by the FTC. As such,
there is some support for the theory that CPAs allow private litigants to bring smaller scale cases
that approximate FTC enforcement actions but might not warrant allocation of FTC resources.
C. Control Results—FTC Cases
As discussed, 10 FTC cases were included in Round 1 but were not otherwise designated
as FTC cases in any way. The FTC litigated 8 of these cases and issued complaints for the
remaining two that it ultimately dismissed. The Shadow Commission agreed in each of the 10
cases that the scenario described unfair or deceptive conduct. This result suggests that the
Shadow FTC was able to reach the same conclusion as the FTC in practice. In contrast to these
FTC control cases, the Shadow Commission believed there was possible illegal conduct in only
15.9% or 22.0% of the general CPA cases depending on whether ongoing cases are included.
The differences are statistically significant regardless of whether we count ongoing cases.124
Likewise, in all 10 of the FTC cases a majority of Shadow Commissioners thought the FTC
might initiate an enforcement action in contrast to the 6.8% or 12.0% of Round 1 general CPA
cases the Shadow Commissioners agreed might have been enforced (depending on whether the
ongoing cases are dropped). Again, these differences are statistically significant.125
The Shadow Commission identified similar characteristics in the FTC and state-court
scenarios, and reached accurate conclusions regarding FTC action. This gives credence to the
123

For the 43 cases that did not have a tied Shadow Commission, a two-sample test of proportions allowed us to reject the
null hypothesis that the proportions of cases where the majority of Shadow Commissioners believe there was illegal conduct and
where the majority of Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement action were equal at the 1% level
(z = 3.088, p = 0.002).
124
A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of cases where the majority of
Shadow Commissioners believed the scenarios contained some illegal conduct is the same between FTC cases and general CPA
cases in Round 1 at the 1% level (z = -4.721, p = 0.000 for all cases and z = -5.168, p = 0.000 for completed cases only). We get
similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation.
125
A two-group test of proportions allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the proportion of cases where the majority of
Shadow Commissioners believed the FTC would initiate an enforcement action based on available case facts is the same between
FTC cases and general CPA cases in Round 1 at the 1% level (z = -5.745, p = 0.000 for all cases and z = -6.221, p = 0.000 for
completed cases only). We get similar results for the non-parametric Spearman rank correlation.
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Shadow Commission's findings in non-FTC case scenarios. Further, the results may suggest that
while the clear CPA wins are more similar to FTC cases than general CPA claims, even winning
CPA cases are at least somewhat unlike FTC cases. In other words, the clear CPA wins may
have a higher probability of involving illegal conduct under the FTC standards in the majority of
instances, but nonetheless may not necessarily be cases the FTC is likely to enforce.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
This Article set out to study whether state little-FTC Acts do, in fact, pursue the same
mission as the FTC. This Article has produced a number of findings that will inform policy
debates on CPAs.

The Shadow Commission study demonstrates that there are qualitative

differences between CPAs decisions and actions that would likely be found to be illegal and
enforced under relevant FTC standards. Most CPA claims would not constitute illegal conduct
under FTC consumer protection standards. The Shadow FTC found that 78% of a sample of
CPA claims would not constitute legally unfair or deceptive conduct under FTC policy
statements. While relatively few CPA claims would constitute illegal conduct under the FTC
standard (22%), even fewer (12%) would result in FTC enforcement action. Almost 40% of
CPA claims where the consumer plaintiff prevailed at trial would not constitute illegal conduct
under FTC consumer protection standards. In a sample of CPA claims where the consumer
plaintiff prevailed in court, the Shadow FTC found that 38% of these successful claims would
not constitute illegal conduct under the FTC standard. Although most of these successful cases
would meet the FTC illegality standards, the Shadow Survey results suggest that only 23%
would likely be enforced by the FTC.
These findings have important implications for those interested in discussing and
formulating public policy regarding CPAs:
1. To the extent that CPAs are envisioned as complements to FTC consumer protection,
they appear to overshoot the mark. While resource limitations prevent the FTC from
pursuing enforcement in every case of unfair or deceptive conduct, this Article suggests that
CPAs go well beyond filling this gap. Instead, CPAs may allow consumers to pursue
different types of claims, including many that do not involve conduct that would be illegal
under FTC standards for consumer protection.
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2. To the extent that the FTC standard meets its goal of an optimal balance between the
public interest and protection of individual consumers, it is uncertain that the broader
The FTC standard seeks to limit consumer

coverage of CPAs benefits consumers.

protection enforcement to those actions that will serve the public interest generally. CPAs
that reach beyond this optimal enforcement goal may deter businesses from legitimate
activity and force them to focus on legal matters unrelated to their business goals.
Additionally, any increases in consumer protection that are provided by CPAs must be
considered against the burdens that they impose on the civil justice system.

The results presented in this Article may usefully inform policy discussions on CPAs, but
the analysis has limitations. The case fact descriptions forming the basis of the excerpts given to
Shadow Commissioners may not have included all of the facts ultimately relevant to the
determination of liability. Nevertheless, the results clearly suggest that private litigation under
little-FTC Acts tends to pursue a different consumer protection mission than the Bureau of
Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade Commission.
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APPENDIX A: SHADOW FTC SCENARIO EXAMPLE—ROUND 1
Scenario 1:
Real Estate Agent (REA) buys and resells houses for a profit and he became interested in purchasing a house being offered for
sale by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). REA personally inspected the house and decided to
make an offer to purchase it. His initial offer was rejected by HUD in favor of another offer but was placed as a back-up in the
event the contract for sale with the winning bidder did not close. The winning bidder hired a licensed inspector to examine the
house and found evidence of active termites inside the home, including noticeable holes in the bathroom ceiling and active
termites in the baseboards. The winning bidder terminated the contract, and HUD then asked REA if he was still interested in
purchasing the property. REA personally examined the house again and purchased it stating he did not see any evidence of
termites in the house before he bought it. Shortly after purchasing the property, REA hired several contractors to make repairs
and improvements, intending to place the house back on the market for sale once the repairs were completed.
Contractor had done remodeling work for REA in the past on a number of different houses, and was hired to perform general
repair work including repainting the interior and exterior walls. During the course of making repairs, Contractor noticed evidence
of active termites. Contractor may have informed REA about the termites, and may have been told him to continue his work
making cosmetic repairs. Contractor has also apparently covered over termite damage in other homes for REA. Contractor went
ahead with the repairs as asked by REA.
Buyers became aware of the house being sold by REA through their real estate agent. Buyers toured the house with his agent
and it had been newly painted and carpeted. Buyers made an offer to purchase the house and, following a series of negotiations,
signed an earnest money contract. On the same day he entered into the earnest money contract, Buyers received a "Seller's
Disclosure of Property Condition" form signed by REA. REA indicated on the form that he had no knowledge of any active
termites, termite damage, or previous termite treatment. Buyers hired an inspector to examine the house, and an inspection was
performed one month later. This inspection uncovered active termites on the house's exterior, as well as evidence of previous
termite treatment along the front porch. REA paid to have a "spot" treatment done for the termites on the exterior. The sale of the
house to the Buyers closed in the following month.
A few months later, the Buyers discovered a swarm of termites inside their home. They telephoned REA who referred them to
the pest control company that performed the spot treatment before closing. The company returned to the home and performed
another spot treatment. This appeared to resolve the problem until the following year when termites again swarmed inside the
house. This time the Buyers paid for a full treatment by a different pest control company. The Buyers also hired a general
contractor to examine the house and estimate the cost of repairing the damage caused by the termites.

Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally deceptive under the FTC’s deception policy
statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception that are not satisfied.
□ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer
□ The consumer's interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation, omission or practice is
reasonable under the circumstances
□ The representation, omission or practice must be material
Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally unfair under the FTC’s unfairness policy statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for unfairness that are not satisfied.
□ Cause substantial injury
□ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive benefits
□ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided
Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a consumer protection enforcement action?
□ Yes
□ No
Q3b. Briefly explain__________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B: SHADOW FTC SCENARIO EXAMPLE—ROUND 2
Scenario 1:
David D. is a developmentally disabled young man who has been under the legal guardianship of his parents since he turned
eighteen. At the age of 21, David D. was living in his own apartment, but his parents strictly controlled his finances. They spoke
with David D. nearly every day.
David D. wanted to buy a car but neither of his parents would allow him to do so. They assumed their word would be final
because they did not realize that David D. could obtain any appreciable amount of money with his debit card. David D. went to
Car Dealership, used his debit card to buy a new car, and received credit for a trade-in on his old car.
Days after David D. bought the car, his mother came to Car Dealership and explained that David D. was under the legal
guardianship of his parents and had no legal authority to enter into a contract to buy the car. She showed Car Dealership David
D.'s guardianship papers and asked to return the car. Car Dealership would not take back the car saying that the company sold
cars to "a lot of people who aren't very smart" and that the contract was valid. David D.’s mother insisted that the contract was
void, but Car Dealership handed the keys to David D. who drove off in the new car.
A few days later, David D. damaged the car in a one-car accident. His parents then managed to get the car away from David D.
and return it to Car Dealership. However, when David D. called Car Dealership to ask for his trade-in back, someone at Car
Dealership told him that he could not have it but could pick up his new car any time. David D. got a ride to Car Dealership and
picked up the new car. The next day his parents were able to convince David D. to return the car to Car Dealership yet again,
and this time he left the car there.
Several people called Car Dealership on behalf of David D.’s parents including the investigator for David D.'s guardianship
case. Car Dealership was advised that the guardianship did indeed make the contract legally void but it apparently did not listen
to that advice. Car Dealership did not seek legal advice on the validity of the contract until a month after the sale.
Car Dealership assigned David D.'s loan to a collection agency but never informed it of David D.'s incapacity. It also
demanded storage fees from David D. for keeping the new car on its lot. It sold David D.'s trade-in on the same day the new car
was brought back for the second time, even though the sale was still being contested.

Q1a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally deceptive under the FTC’s deception policy
statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q1b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for deception that are not satisfied.
□ A misrepresentation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer
□ The consumer's interpretation or reaction to the misrepresentation, omission or practice is
reasonable under the circumstances
□ The representation, omission or practice must be material
Q2a. Based on the case facts, do you believe the alleged practice is legally unfair under the FTC’s unfairness policy statement?
□ Yes
□ No
Q2b. If no, please identify the legal prerequisite or prerequisites for unfairness that are not satisfied.
□ Cause substantial injury
□ Consumer injury not outweighed by offsetting consumer or competitive benefits
□ Injury could not have been reasonably avoided
Q3a. Based on the facts presented above, do you believe the FTC would initiate a consumer protection enforcement action?
□ Yes
□ No
Q3b. Briefly explain_____________________________
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